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Marxism and the ‘Dutch Miracle’: 





The Dutch Republic holds a marginal position in the debate on the transition from feudalism to 
capitalism, despite its signiﬁcance in the early stage of the development of global capitalism. 
While the positions of those Marxists who did consider the Dutch case range from seeing it as 
the ﬁrst capitalist country to rejecting it as an essentially non-capitalist commercial society, all 
involved basically accept an image of Dutch development as being driven by commerce rather 
than real advances in the sphere of production. Their shared interpretation of the Dutch ‘Golden 
Age’, however, rests on an interpretation of Dutch economic history that does not match the 
current state of historical knowledge. Rereading the debate on the Dutch trajectory towards 
capitalism in the light of recent economic historiography seriously challenges established views, 
and questions both major strands in the transition-debate.
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Introduction1
The Dutch case has long puzzled historians of the transition from feudalism 
to capitalism.2 Here is a country that, to all outside appearances, attained 
1. The names given to the area that today comprises the Netherlands are cause for some 
confusion. In early-modern times, ‘the Netherlands’ and ‘Low Countries’ were used both for 
present-day Belgium (the Southern Netherlands or Southern Low Countries) and the Netherlands 
(the Northern Netherlands or Northern Low Countries). These areas did not form a nation, but 
a collection of formally independent provinces. Holland was one of those provinces, in the 
North-West, as was Flanders in the South. The name ‘Holland’ is often used to describe the 
whole of the present-day Netherlands (as by Marx in many of the here-quoted passages), but, 
strictly speaking, this is wrong. After the Revolt against Spain, the Southern Netherlands 
remained part of the (Spanish and, later, Austrian) Habsburg Empire, while the Northern 
Netherlands formed a state, alternatively called the Dutch Republic or the United Provinces.
2. I would like to thank the participants at the Fifth Historical Materialism Annual Conference 
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capitalistic features from a very early stage in its history. If nothing else, even 
its art would have helped to shape public notions of early-modern Dutch 
society in this direction. The many group-portraits of the merchant-élite 
governing the Dutch Republic bear the unmistakeable marks of a society 
driven by the logic of commodity-production. Whether exercising control 
over the quality of textile-production, administrating an orphanage or 
overseeing an almshouse, the core-business of the men and women portrayed 
was making money. Rembrandt’s staalmeesters, the syndics of the cloth-makers 
guild, are bent over the account-book they were discussing just a moment 
before the audacious spectator forced them to temporarily cease their business. 
Simply on the basis of its self-representation, many will agree with the Dutch 
historian Huizinga who described Dutch civilisation of the seventeenth 
century as ‘thoroughly bourgeois’.3
However, the question of whether the social structures underpinning this 
culture were capitalist or merely highly urbanised and bürgerlich4 remains 
hotly disputed. After all, despite the ﬂourishing of its seventeenth-century 
‘Golden Age’, the Dutch Republic was not the location of an early industrial 
revolution. After a brief spell in which Amsterdam acted as the central entrepôt 
of world-trade and the geographically tiny Republic reached the status of a 
global superpower, a period of decline set in which saw the locus of economic 
growth and military might shift decisively away from the sandy shores of the 
province of Holland. For many, this signiﬁes that the United Provinces, at best, 
represented a preliminary stage to real capitalist development – a prime example 
of a failed transition to industrial society5 and, at most, a detour in the process 
of capitalist state-formation.6 Non-Marxist and Marxist historians alike can be 
found on either side of this debate. The main focus of this article will be on 
the latter, but, of course, there is a high level of mutual inﬂuence.7 
(November 2008) and the Economic History Lunch-Seminar of Utrecht University (March 
2009) for their willingness to engage with me in this puzzle. Special thanks are due to Bas van 
Bavel, Neil Davidson, Jessica Dijkman, the late and greatly-missed Chris Harman, Marjolein 
’t Hart, Maarten Prak, Maina van der Zwan, and the two anonymous referees for their detailed 
comments and suggestions on earlier drafts, as well as for sharing unpublished material. Naturally, 
they do not share any responsibility either for the theoretical direction taken or for any mistakes 
this article contains. 
3. Huizinga 1941, p. 62.
4. As is the main focus of studies such as Prak 2010.
5. Krantz and Hohenberg (eds.) 1975.
6. Lachmann 2002, p. 147. 
7. For some inﬂuential non-Marxists who treat the Dutch Republic as a ‘modern’ phenomenon, 
see North and Thomas 1973, Kennedy 1989, and De Vries and Van der Woude 1997. 
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Within the wider debate on the transition from feudalism to capitalism, the 
Dutch Republic occupies a marginal position at best.8 But, even so, the 
position taken by diﬀerent authors, often only in passing and based on very 
general perceptions of Dutch history, is of signiﬁcance for their overall views 
on the rise of capitalism. The Dutch Republic is the obvious contender to 
Britain in producing the ﬁrst ‘really-existing capitalist country’. Rejecting or 
accepting this case therefore tells us something important about the supposed 
uniqueness of the British experience. Given that much of this debate has been 
cast as a discussion on ‘why Britain succeeded where the rest failed’, the Dutch 
case becomes an interesting point for corroboration.
The aim of this article is twofold. First, it is to locate the debate on the 
nature of the Dutch Republic within the wider transition-debate, tracing back 
the roots of the diﬀerent positions to the scattered comments of Smith and 
Marx on this subject. However, many of the arguments used in this debate are 
based on a model of Dutch ‘merchant-capitalism’ that is scantily worked out, 
often stereotypical, and which on the whole does not correspond to the 
ﬁndings of state-of-the-art historiography on early-modern Dutch society. 
The second objective of this article is therefore to provide an alternative for 
this standard interpretation that is more ﬁrmly grounded in Dutch economic 
historiography. Central to the alternative narrative laid out in the second part 
of this article is the ‘urban-agrarian symbiosis’ that arose in the course of the 
late-medieval period. This particular interrelationship was the founding stone 
of Dutch success in the seventeenth-century ‘Golden Age’. It was based 
primarily on a transformation in production, not on the expansion of 
international trade. But it did allow the Northern Netherlands, particularly 
after the revolt against the Spanish Habsburgs and the establishment of the 
Dutch Republic, to proﬁt from this expansion in a qualitatively diﬀerent way 
than previous trading empires had done. Although this basis was not suﬃcient 
for the Netherlands to complete the transition to industrial capitalism in its 
own right, the advances made by Dutch capital did become a major 
contributing factor to the ﬁnal and more deﬁnitive breakthrough of capitalism 
elsewhere. Treating the Dutch case thus not primarily as a failed transition to 
capitalism, but as one stage in a fundamentally and a priori international 
process of transformation can also help to overcome the Anglocentrism that in 
the past has characterised much of the debate.
8. See the various contributions in Hilton (ed.) 1976 and Aston and Philpin (eds.) 1985. For 
an overview of Dutch Marxist historiography on the early-modern period, see Van der Linden 
1997. 
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The Dutch Republic in the transition-debate
The position taken by diﬀerent Marxist historians on the Dutch Republic is 
roughly correlated to the two great alternative strands in the transition-debate. 
The ﬁrst argues that the rise of capitalism was primarily driven by the expansion 
of trade, leading to the dissolution of feudal relations ‘from the outside’ and 
transforming the social structure in turn. The second focuses on the less visible 
and spectacular (but ultimately more profound) changes that took place at the 
point of production. Among the latter group, probably the most eminent 
today are those who, following Robert Brenner, argue that the main changes 
leading to the transition to capitalism took place in what they call the ‘social-
property relations’ in agriculture.9
It will come as no surprise that the most enthusiastic endorsement of the 
Dutch Republic as a capitalist state has come from those such as Immanuel 
Wallerstein who are ﬁrmly on the ‘commercialisation’-side of the discussion. 
For Wallerstein, the rise of the Dutch coincided with the real breakthrough of 
the modern world-system in the sixteenth century. The motor of both processes 
was the expansion of European trade, accelerated by the subjection of the 
Americas. The United Provinces, freeing themselves from the grip of the 
Habsburg Empire during the Eighty-Years War (1568–1648), could build on 
their previously acquired strong position in Baltic trade. From there they 
established a trading empire that provided them with the wealth needed to 
keep their position at the top of the European hierarchy during the remainder 
of the seventeenth-century ‘Golden Age’.10 Admittedly, Wallerstein does 
accord production a prominent rôle in his account of the strength of the 
Republic. He even makes the assertion that ‘success in mercantilist competition 
was primarily a function of productive eﬃciency and that the middle-run 
objective of all mercantilist state policies was the increase of overall eﬃciency 
in the sphere of production.’11 He proceeds to trace this eﬃciency in both 
Dutch agriculture and manufacture. Nevertheless, the picture he paints of 
Dutch productive development still ultimately stems from the primacy that 
Wallerstein assigns to trade. Production, both for early-modern and for late-
capitalist hegemonic powers, is primarily a tool for domination in the process 
of unequal exchange with their peripheries. And it was here that the Dutch 
Republic supposedly set the mark for all of its successors.
 9. A description of the two main strands in the debate from an essentially ‘outside’ or third 
perspective can be found in Harman 1989 and Harman and Brenner 2006. 
10. Wallerstein 1980, p. 46.
11. Wallerstein 1980, p. 38.
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In his challenging long-term vision of the history of world-capitalism, the 
late Giovanni Arrighi pushed this model still further away from questions 
concerning production. His account of the ‘Dutch Systemic Cycle of 
Accumulation’ puts even more stress on the commercial and ﬁnancial nature 
of Dutch hegemony that lasted far into the eighteenth century.12 It was the 
superior banking techniques at the Amsterdam Bourse that ensured that ‘the 
upper strata of the Dutch merchant class remained the leaders and governors 
of the European capitalist engine. Throughout this period, the Amsterdam 
Bourse remained the central regulatory mechanism through which idle capital 
was rerouted towards new trade ventures’.13
Against these trade and ﬁnance-centred accounts stand those which look 
for the origins of capitalism primarily in the sphere of production. In the 
main, this has led these authors to a more negative estimation of the impact of 
Dutch development on the emergence of capitalist relations. Of course, they 
allow as well for some important capitalist elements evolving in the Low 
Countries (comprising the medieval-Flemish and Brabant centres of trade and 
production as well as the Northern Netherlands). However, writers such as 
Maurice Dobb tended to see the subordination of production to trade as an 
insurmountable barrier to capitalist growth beyond a ‘promising and precocious 
adolescence’. The position taken by Dobb is the mirror-image to the 
Wallerstein-Arrighi approach: ‘It would seem as though the very success and 
maturity of merchant and money-lending capital in these rich continental 
centres of entrepôt trade, instead of aiding, retarded the progress of investment 
in production; so that, compared with the glories of spoiling the Levant or the 
Indies or lending to princes, industrial capital was doomed to occupy the place 
of a dowerless and unlovely younger sister.’14 The rise of capitalist production 
was not aided, but hindered, by the dominance of international trade.
Eric Hobsbawm put this argument in an international context in his seminal 
article, ‘The Crisis of the Seventeenth Century’. He argued that the 
embeddedness of Dutch commerce in a still-feudal European system of trade, 
reﬂecting the underdeveloped nature of productive capacities in the home-
market, put constraints on its economic development that the Republic 
was not able to break. Even at the peak of its seventeenth-century splendour, 
the Netherlands remained ‘in many respects a “feudal business” economy; a 
Florence, Antwerp or Augsburg on a semi-national scale.’15 In line with the 
Brenner thesis, Ellen Meiksins Wood has recently extended this argument to 
12. Arrighi 2002, pp. 127–44.
13. Arrighi 2002, p. 140.
14. Dobb 1963, p. 160; compare p. 195.
15. Hobsbawm 1967, pp. 44–5.
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questions of agricultural change. For her, instead of being forced to invest by 
the competitive pressure of rival capitals, Dutch merchants and (crucially) 
commercial farmers only made clever use of market-opportunities as a 
temporary strategy.16 The main interest of the ruling class did not reside in 
accumulation and ‘improvement’ in production, but in public oﬃce as a 
means to control monopolistic trading advantages. When international trading 
opportunities declined under pressure of the seventeenth-century crisis, the 
Dutch élite fully withdrew to ‘political accumulation’. For Wood, ‘the Dutch 
Republic enjoyed its Golden Age not as a capitalist economy but as the last 
and most highly developed non-capitalist commercial society’.17
The Dutch Republic in Smith and Marx
The authors cited diﬀer signiﬁcantly in their analysis of Dutch society and its 
place within the wider transition. But they do share a similar appreciation of 
the sources of Dutch wealth. Whether they put more emphasis on the 
European bulk-carrying trade or the colonial luxury-trade, all agree that 
commerce was at the origin of the Dutch ‘Golden Age’. Production is viewed 
from the angle of this commercial success, not as a factor in itself. In taking 
the merchant-regent as the essential Dutch character, they can build on a 
large body of popularising literature well-known in the English-speaking 
world.18 The pedigree of this view goes back to the eighteenth century, if 
not earlier, when the Dutch Republic – not completely realistically – was held 
up as a successful example of the unfettered rule of free trade.19 The writings 
of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century pamphleteers and early political 
economists such as Petty and Davenant formed the limited sources from 
which both Adam Smith and Karl Marx drew their views on the Dutch 
Republic.
For Adam Smith, the Dutch Republic was the prime example of a purely 
commercial society. This country, he wrote in a passage extolling the advantages 
of a free-port system, ‘not only derives its whole wealth, but a great part of its 
necessary subsistence, from foreign trade’.20 Elsewhere, Smith again takes 
foreign trade as the basis of Dutch success: ‘Holland, in proportion to the 
extent of the land and the number of its inhabitants, by far the richest country 
16. Wood 2002a, p. 90; Wood 2002b.
17. Wood 2002a, p. 94. Very similar arguments can be found in Teschke 2003, pp. 136 and 
208, and Dumolyn 2004, p. 257.
18. For example, Barbour 1950, Boxer 1965 and Wilson 1968.
19. Nijenhuis 2002, p. 118, and Reinert 2009, pp. 30ﬀ.
20. Smith 1999b, p. 76.
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in Europe, has . . . the greatest share of the carrying trade of Europe.’21 He 
suggested that the Dutch primacy in European trade was still a fact in the 
second half of the eighteenth century.22 Low interest-rates stimulated the 
Dutch bourgeoisie not to let their money lay idle and invested the whole of 
society with a mercantile frame of mind. ‘It is there unfashionable not to be a 
man of business. Necessity makes it usual for almost every man to be so, and 
custom everywhere regulates fashion.’23 Writing in the decade running up to 
the fourth Anglo-Dutch War, Smith of course acknowledged that the leading 
position of the Dutch was not entirely due to free trade. Military strength 
played an important rôle as well.24 But, on the whole, it was the favourable 
attitude taken by the Dutch rulers to the interests of free trade that formed the 
main reason for its success. This attitude was promoted by the fact that 
merchants themselves ruled the country:
The republican form of government seems to be the principal support of the 
present grandeur of Holland. The owners of great capitals, the great mercantile 
families, have generally either some direct share or some indirect inﬂuence in 
the administration of that government. . . . The residence of such wealthy people 
necessarily keeps alive, in spite of all disadvantages, a certain degree of industry in 
the country.25
Smith provided a framework that still shapes many of the mainstream 
interpretations of Dutch economic history. Two hundred years after The 
Wealth of Nations, North and Thomas wrote their inﬂuential history, The Rise 
of the Western World, explicitly aimed at providing ‘a framework consistent 
with and complementary to standard neo-classical economic theory.’26 In it, 
they take the Netherlands to be ‘the ﬁrst areas of Western Europe to escape the 
Malthusian checks’ associated with feudalism.27 Like Smith, they treat trade 
and commerce as ‘the prime mover of the Dutch economy throughout 
the early modern period’.28 And, again following Smith, they argue that the 
republican political institutions were key to its success: ‘it is clear that in 
the Netherlands property rights appropriate for the development of both 
an eﬃcient product market and a short-term capital market had been created. 
21. Smith 1999a, p. 473.
22. Smith 1999b, p. 40.
23. Smith 1999a, p. 199.
24. Smith 1999b, pp. 40–1.
25. Smith 1999b, p. 505.
26. North and Thomas 1973, p. vii.
27. North and Thomas 1973, p. 132.
28. North and Thomas 1973, p. 134.
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The inﬂuence of those developments . . . permeated the entire Dutch 
economy.’29
The most elaborate version of this Smithian view can probably be found in 
the magnum opus of Fernand Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism. Here, 
Braudel tells the story of a ‘poor country’ that, due to geographical and 
historical coincidence, could become the nodal point between the diﬀerent 
developing markets of Europe. Dominance in the Baltic trade, primarily 
the grain-trade that the Dutch called their ‘mother-trade’, was enough to 
propel the Dutch ‘high-voltage urban economy’30 into a long period of 
success.31 ‘Once Holland had conquered the trade of Europe, the rest of the 
world was a logical bonus, thrown in as it were.’32 It is this view of Dutch 
primacy built on the founding stone of international trade that provides the 
framework for many mainstream interpretations of Dutch history. Mediated 
by the work of its twentieth-century popularisers, it constitutes the prism 
through which both sides in the transition-debate have consistently read 
Marx’s own comments on Dutch capitalism. 
Marx’s approach to the Dutch case revolves around two remarks. In the ﬁrst 
volume of Capital, Marx famously described Holland as ‘the head capitalistic 
nation of the 17th century’.33 But this description seems to be contradicted 
by the passages in the third volume of Capital, where he stresses the limits of 
societies dominated by merchant-capitalism.34 Accordingly, his ultimate 
judgement on the extent to which the Dutch Republic reached the stage of 
capitalism seems more negative: ‘The history of Holland’s decline as the 
dominant trading nation is the history of the subordination of commercial 
capital to industrial capital.’35 Taken by themselves, these could easily be held 
for throw-away remarks and even for simple adaptations of Smith’s conclusions 
to his own theoretical framework. The notebooks now available through the 
MEGA project show that this was not the case.36 They show that Marx had a 
keen interest in Dutch economic history, and that his observations in Volumes 
1 and 3 of Capital were grounded in a wide reading of contemporary economic 
historians and pre-Smithian economic texts.37 
29. North and Thomas 1973, p. 141.
30. Braudel 2002, p. 180.
31. Braudel 2002, p. 282.
32. Braudel 2002, p. 207.
33. Marx 1965, p. 704. 
34. Marx 1991, p. 448. 
35. Marx 1991, p. 451. 
36. Lourens and Lucassen 1992.
37. Marx and Engels 1983, pp. 246–8, 390–2, and 389–404.
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The ﬁrst thing to note is that Marx’s main focus was not on the development 
of trade as such, but on the interconnections between trade and production. 
In Volume 3 of Capital, he explains that ‘the great revolutions that took place 
in trade in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries’ could only become 
accelerating-factors in the transformation of the economic base where changes 
in the ﬁeld of production had already begun. ‘[T]he modern mode of 
production in its ﬁrst period, that of manufacture, developed only where 
the conditions for it had been created in the Middle Ages. Compare Holland 
with Portugal, for example.’ The diﬀerence between the two, Marx explains, 
lay in the ‘predominant role of the basis laid by ﬁshing, manufacture and 
agriculture for Holland’s development’.38 In an excerpt he made in the mid-
1840s from a work by Friedrich List, he articulated the same contrast in 
relation not to Portugal but to the Hanseatic cities: ‘The Hanseatic cities 
founded their trade “not on the production and consumption, on the 
agriculture and manufacture of the land to which the merchants belonged” . . . 
“they bought there, where they could have the commodities at the cheapest. 
But when the countries from which they bought, and the countries to which 
they sold excluded them from their markets, neither their own agriculture nor 
their internal manufacture were so developed that their superﬂuous merchant-
capital could ﬁnd accommodation there; therefore, it disappeared to Holland 
and England”.’39 Thus, Marx linked the shifts in late-medieval and early-
modern trade-routes that beneﬁted the Low Countries to the presence of an 
already more developed productive base.
Marx diﬀered from Smith and his followers not only in this assertion that 
changes in production were the starting point of Dutch commercial success. 
He also highlighted diﬀerent factors in the ending of Dutch trading supremacy. 
It is this element that writers such as Dobb and Wood point to. Indeed, Marx 
considered the dominant position that commercial capital attained over its 
productive counterparts in areas such as Northern Italy and the Low Countries 
as much a barrier as an advantage to further development in production. This 
‘law that the independent development of commodity capital stands in inverse 
proportion to the level of development of capitalist production appears 
particularly clearly in the history of the carrying trade, as conducted by the 
Venetians, Genoans, Dutch, etc., where the major proﬁt was made not by 
supplying a speciﬁc national product, but rather by mediating the exchange of 
products between commercially – and generally economically – undeveloped 
communities and by exploiting both the producing countries.’40 Once the 
38. Marx 1991, p. 450.
39. Marx and Engels 1981, p. 513; my translation.
40. Marx 1991, p. 446.
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societies at both extremes of this mediation became centres of capitalist 
production in their own right, the rôle of the independent intermediary 
became more-and-more obsolete. Being out-competed ﬁrst in the area of 
production and then in the area of trade, the capitalists in the former 
commercial centres started to transfer their money elsewhere, and became 
agents for capitalist development across borders.
Thus the villainies of the Venetian thieving system formed one of the secret bases 
of the capital-wealth of Holland to whom Venice in her decadence lent large 
sums of money. So also was it with Holland and England. By the beginning of the 
18th century the Dutch manufactures were far outstripped. Holland had ceased 
to be the nation preponderant in commerce and industry. One of its main lines 
of business, therefore, from 1701–1776, is the lending out of enormous amounts 
of capital, especially to its great rival England.41 
Even though the Amsterdam capital-market still commanded enormous 
amounts of wealth in the ﬁrst decades of the eighteenth century, Marx dated 
the highpoint (and therefore the start of decline) of Dutch commercial wealth 
as early as 1648.42 Hereafter, Dutch capital started to suﬀer from increasing 
competition from the English and the French. This competition translated 
into ﬁerce military conﬂict, mercantilist measures protecting home-markets 
from Dutch intrusion, and the building-up of local manufactures that ended 
the English and French dependence on Dutch imports. The ﬂowering of the 
Amsterdam stock-exchange in the eighteenth century, far from being a 
symptom of continued economic strength, was a result of the relative decline 
of the productive base.
A third diﬀerence between Marx’s account and Smith’s lies in his views on 
the rôle of the Dutch state. Whereas Smith and his followers stressed the 
commercial virtues of the Dutch political élite, Marx held a rather less friendly – 
and much more realistic – position on the Dutch ruling class. Not respect for 
property-rights in general, but a deep commitment to the property of the 
Dutch capitalist élite at the cost of anyone else characterised the operations of 
the Dutch state. The property-rights of either colonial peoples or the poorer 
classes within the Netherlands were never part of the equation, and the state 
did not act as a neutral guarantor towards them. Marx approvingly quoted a 
description of Dutch colonial administration as ‘one of the most extraordinary 
relations of treachery, bribery, massacre, and meanness’.43 The large public 
41. Marx 1965, p. 707.
42. Marx 1965, p. 705.
43. Marx 1965, p. 704. The quote is from the former Lieutenant-Governor of Java, Thomas 
Stamford Raﬄes.
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debt and developed system of taxation underpinning Dutch naval and military 
power – two other Dutch novelties that Smith greatly admired – were viewed 
in the same spirit. Public debt formed both a secure outlet for capital-
investment and a source for state-demand, thus becoming ‘one of the most 
powerful levers of primitive accumulation’.44 But the cost of this system was 
high taxation, which rested disproportionably on the lower classes:
Modern ﬁscality, whose pivot is formed by taxes on the most necessary means of 
subsistence (thereby increasing their prices), thus contains within itself the germ 
of automatic progression. Over-taxation is not an incident, but rather a principle. 
In Holland, therefore, where this system was ﬁrst inaugurated, the great patriot, 
De Witt, has in his ‘Maxims’ extolled it as the best system for making the wage-
labourer submissive, frugal, industrious, and overburdened with labour.45
The picture that emerges from those passages clearly diﬀers from the one 
painted by Smith and his followers. But the most important element of this 
diﬀerence has been missed by all Marxists writing on the subject. In taking 
‘agriculture, ﬁshing and manufacture’ as the founding stone, rather than as a 
by-product of Dutch commercial success, Marx hinted at an explanation of 
the origins of the Dutch ‘Golden Age’ that is seriously at odds with the 
prevalent view of the Dutch case as a ‘pure’ form of merchant-capitalism. 
However, this focus on the productive base underneath the glittering expansion 
of trade ﬁts in remarkably well with the ﬁndings of economic historians over 
the last thirty years.
Medieval roots and divergent paths
Within the conﬁnes of this article, only a short and summary overview is 
possible of the transformation of the Dutch economy in the late-medieval and 
early-modern period. This necessarily comes at the expense of many important 
aspects of this story. Too little attention can be given to the relationship 
between the Northern and Southern Netherlands (now Belgium), which 
contained Europe’s most developed urban economies but were cut oﬀ from 
the North in the course of the Dutch Revolt.46 Another real omission is a 
44. Marx 1965, p. 706.
45. Marx 1965, p. 708. The work cited, long wrongly ascribed to the seventeenth-century 
Dutch statesman Johan de Witt, is the Interest of Holland, written by Pieter de la Court, the author 
of the ﬁrst systematic defence of free trade and a labour-market free from guild-regulations.
46. A short overview of the interrelation between North and South before the Revolt can be 
found in Van Zanden 1993a.
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proper account of the structure of the Dutch colonial empire.47 This is not 
because these issues are unimportant, but simply because some of the main 
interpretative battles to be waged are about the structure of Dutch society at 
home and its position within European markets. Understanding those will 
also increase our understanding of the Dutch mode of operation overseas. 
Taking in all those aspects would require at least a book. What follows must 
therefore remain highly incomplete. We nonetheless hope that this article will 
provide a vantage-point for further debate, which can compensate for these 
shortcomings and omissions.
Traditionally, the rise of Dutch commercial dominance has been dated from 
the fall of Antwerp to Spanish troops in 1585. The inﬂux of Southern 
merchants into the Northern cities and the blockade of the Scheldt allowed 
Amsterdam to become what Antwerp had been until then: the staple market 
of Europe. The overrunning of the Flanders and Brabant towns by the Spanish 
armies certainly accelerated the shift of economic weight from South to 
North. However, as Blockmans has rightly stressed, ‘It would have been 
impossible to take up this role immediately without having developed a 
structural basis during the preceding centuries.’48 Recent historiography 
therefore puts much more emphasis on the medieval roots of Dutch economic 
expansion. Already in the ﬁfteenth century, the Western provinces formed the 
most urbanised area of Europe. They also contained a highly diﬀerentiated, 
commercialised and technologically advanced agriculture. At least in the 
seaborne peat-areas in the West and the North and the river-clay regions, 
this coincided with a class-structure on the land that was markedly diﬀerent 
from that of most European agriculture. In the Land of Culemborg, large 
tenant-farms worked by wage-labourers in the ﬁfteenth and sixteenth centuries 
replaced small and medium-sized family-farms. New types of extensive 
agriculture were developed in order to reduce the required labour-input and 
maximise proﬁts.49 In Southern Holland, even before the Revolt, wealthy 
burghers bought plots of land from peasants on a large scale.50 And, in Guelders 
during the ﬁfteenth and sixteenth centuries, ‘three-quarters of the land was 
leased out, the mobility of the lease land was high, population pressure was 
relatively low and market specialisation was attractive in view of the proximity 
of large population centres in Brabant, Flanders and especially Holland’.51 As 
47. The classic work in the English language on this subject remains Boxer 1965.
48. Blockmans 1993, p. 42. For recent studies on the impact of Southern-Netherlands 
merchants on Dutch trade, see Gelderblom 2000, pp. 242ﬀ., and Lesger 2006, pp. 139ﬀ.
49. Van Bavel 1999a, p. 307.
50. Van Bavel 2004, p. 139.
51. Van Bavel 2004, p. 141.
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a result, a structure of landholding arose in which ‘already from the sixteenth 
century onwards the only distinction that mattered was between property 
(eygendom) and short-term leasehold (huer), even if, in a formal sense, all 
the older categories of land tenure . . . somehow survived.’52 Moreover, the 
advanced structure of agriculture went hand-in-hand with the rise of substantial 
urban production, connected to a growing integration within international 
markets.
This marketisation, however, was in no way a natural given. Around 
the year 1250, according to Hoppenbrouwers ‘the Netherlands by all signs 
retained a backward, rather primitive peasant economy. Towns and markets 
were virtually non-existent, as was anything like centralized power.’53 
Feudal structures in those areas were weak, but this was a result of their 
marginal position. Small-scale manorialism, subsistence-farming and simple 
commodity-production characterised the structure of agriculture in many 
areas until the time of the great late-feudal crisis. In the centuries that followed, 
fundamental changes took place in the organisation of agriculture in the Low 
Countries, stretching from production-techniques to the forms of land-
ownership, the distribution of control between peasants, lords and burghers, 
the application of wage-labour, the rôle of specialisation and the measure of 
marketisation. But these changes did not follow similar paths in all of the 
Netherlands’ diﬀerent regions, and not every area underwent them to the 
same extent. In his recent overview of Dutch agricultural history from 500 to 
1600, Van Bavel discerns roughly three types of regions:54
(1) Areas such as Drenthe and the Veluwe, where very little change took 
place until the seventeenth century or even later. Agriculture remained largely 
subsistence-oriented, peasants retained control over the land, and only slight 
specialisation took place until some of them were forced to adapt to the 
capitalist relations becoming dominant elsewhere.
(2) Areas such as the Guelders river-area, coastal Frisia and coastal Flanders, 
in which a transition to large-scale, labour-extensive, capital-intensive farming 
took place relatively early. By the ﬁfteenth and sixteenth centuries, land had 
accumulated into the hands of wealthy tenant-farmers, who employed fully-
proletarianised wage-labourers in market-oriented cattle-breeding and grain-
cultivation. Around 75 per cent or even more of the land was leased out, often 
52. Van Bavel and Hoppenbrouwers 2004, p. 16.
53. Hoppenbrouwers 2006, p. 254.
54. Van Bavel 2010a, pp. 244–7, 336. For a general summary of the argument, see also Van 
Bavel 2010b.
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on contracts with very short terms, and the rate of turnover for land under the 
pressure of competition was high.55
(3) Areas such as inland Flanders and Holland, where increased market-
orientation was combined with intensive subsistence-farming. Peasant-
landholding remained dominant for a long time, and specialisation was 
reached on rather small plots, using labour-intensive techniques to produce 
for nearby urban markets. Proto-industrial activities, taking place on 
an impressive scale, were usually combined with subsistence-farming. In 
Holland, this became the launching-pad for a further transformation towards 
large-scale capitalist agriculture on the one hand and more proletarianised 
wage-labour on the other, whereas, in inland Flanders, this did not occur until 
much later.
It is useful to examine these diverging paths in a bit more detail. In Drenthe, 
it seems that the combination of low yields on the sandy grounds and successful 
peasant-resistance against the strengthening of feudal control account for 
the survival of small-scale peasant-production and communal lands. After 
a coalition of nobles suﬀered a crushing defeat in 1227, in which the Bishop 
of Utrecht and some four-hundred nobles were killed in the swamps, 
what remained of manorial lordship disintegrated, allowing the peasants 
to strengthen their hold on the land and the commons.56 In the long run, 
technological change remained slow, sheep were herded in communal ﬂocks 
for centuries to come, subsistence-farming remained predominant, less than a 
quarter to a third of the land was leased out, and, even during the seventeenth 
century, the spread of wage-labour was rather limited (though, with 25–30 per 
cent, still high in comparison to most of Europe).57 Here, then, we seem to 
have a classic Brennerian case in which ‘the emerging predominance of small 
peasant property’ short-circuited a transition to rural capitalism.58 However, it 
should be noted that, even here, the conservatism inherent in the existing 
structures was not absolute, and market-inﬂuences started to penetrate from 
the outside once the transition to agrarian capitalism had been made in 
neighbouring regions.59
The situation in the Guelders river-area was very diﬀerent, if not the 
complete opposite. Manorial lords, territorial rulers and religious institutions 
had maintained strong control over the colonisation of this highly fertile 
region, resulting in a predominance of large landholding. During the thirteenth 
55. Van Bavel 2010a, p. 172.
56. Van Bavel 2010c, pp. 252–3.
57. Van Bavel 2010a, pp. 172, 204, 336.
58. Brenner 1985, p. 30.
59. Bieleman 1987, pp. 40–2.
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and fourteenth centuries, however, manorial organisation came under intense 
pressure. On the one hand, colonisation of the nearby peat-areas oﬀered a 
possibility for peasants to escape serfdom by migration. On the other hand, 
the monetisation of feudal relations and the intense competition between 
manorial and territorial lords forced the landowners to search for means of 
exploitation that were directly proﬁtable. The rise of cities and markets in 
Holland and Brabant enabled them to do so by starting to exploit their land 
commercially, leading to a very early transition to the large-scale lease of 
land on increasingly short terms.60 The competition for lease-contracts created 
strong pressures towards investment, with large landowners spending about 
16 to 20 per cent of their gross income on ‘improvement’ of their agricultural 
holdings (with further increases in the sixteenth century).61 On the other 
hand, it stimulated full proletarianisation, in which former peasants began to 
be employed as wage-labourers on the land. Van Bavel calculates that, in the 
early-sixteenth century, as much as 60 per cent of all labour in this area was 
performed as wage-labour – a proportion only reached in even the more-
industrialised areas of Europe during the nineteenth century.62 It is important 
to note that, until the second half of the sixteenth century, this transformation 
did not lead to a great shift in the distribution of landownership between 
peasants and lords. Rather, large-scale landownership in the hands of the lords 
remained intact, while the underlying social forms of exploitation of the land 
underwent considerable changes towards agrarian capitalism. 
The trajectory of Holland: an urban-agrarian symbiosis
The most interesting case, and probably the most decisive for the later fate of 
the Low Countries, is that of the regions such as Holland. Here, as in the 
Guelders river-area, early commercialisation took place. However, there were 
substantial diﬀerences in the nature of this commercialisation. Whereas, in 
Guelders, colonisation during the high middle ages had produced patterns of 
large-scale landownership under seigneurial control, in Holland, colonisation 
had taken place under the direction of the territorial lords, undercutting the 
power of manorial lords in most areas. Therefore, in large regions, feudal 
control ‘on the ground’ was almost absent, and peasant small-holders owned 
their own land. Population-pressure led to a further subdivision of plots, 
60. Van Bavel 2010a, pp. 88–9 and 180; Van Bavel 1999b, pp. 469ﬀ.
61. Van Bavel 2010a, p. 334. 
62. Van Bavel 2010a, p. 204.
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which must have made conditions for subsistence-farming increasingly 
diﬃcult. These changes then started to accelerate around the fourteenth 
century. Ecological processes resulting from the use of the land led to a sinking 
of the surface by two metres or, in some places, even three metres or more.63 As 
a result, the soil ceased to be suitable for subsistence-farming.
As Bieleman rightly emphasises, this could have led to depopulation, as 
happened elsewhere in Europe.64 But development in Holland took a diﬀerent 
course. An economic redirection started towards commercial farming, largely 
the keeping of livestock for the production of butter and cheese, and, to a 
lesser extent, the cultivating of ‘industrial’ products such as hops (for brewing) 
and hemp (for rope-making), linseed (for oil) and madder (for dyestuﬀs). 
Although peasants remained in control of their small tracts of land, natural 
circumstances increasingly forced them to combine labour-intensive forms of 
agriculture with wage-labour in export-oriented ﬁshing, peat-digging and 
dike-building, proto-industrial activities in rural areas or manufacturing-
work in the towns.65 For this redirection to be possible, a number of conditions 
had to be met earlier, or, at least, more-or-less simultaneously. First, the 
maintenance of any kind of agricultural production under the special ecological 
circumstances of the Low Countries’ peat-areas required rather sophisticated 
techniques for water-management, from wind- and watermills to developed 
systems of cooperation for dike-maintenance.66 The fourteenth to sixteenth 
centuries saw a steady increase in their application. Wealthier farmers and 
townspeople increasingly replaced manorial lords or the Church as investors 
in such instruments for improvement.67 Introduction of new technologies 
in this rural setting laid the basis for their later use in rural or urban 
manufacturing. 
A second precondition for the shift towards commercial farming was 
the possibility to import basic foodstuﬀs. Without some international 
specialisation, and without the development of trading systems to tap into the 
agricultural surpluses of other regions, it would have been impossible to have 
a majority of Holland’s population producing non-subsistence items. This 
connected the rise of commercial agriculture in Holland directly with the 
increase of trade with other, grain-producing regions – Germany, the Southern 
Netherlands, and France at ﬁrst, gradually replaced as the main suppliers of 
63. Bieleman 1993, p. 162.
64. Ibid. 
65. Van Zanden 1993b, Chapter 2.
66. Davids 2008, pp. 64–5.
67. Van Bavel 2010a, p. 148.
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grain by the Baltic from the late-ﬁfteenth century onwards.68 The nodal points 
connecting the emerging highly diﬀerentiated agricultural society to those 
inter-regional networks of trade, of course, were the many towns of medieval 
Holland. Rapid urbanisation took place roughly in the same period as the 
emergence of commercialised agriculture (see Table 1). Jessica Dijkman shows 
that urban fairs in Holland played the rôle that in many other countries 
was played by local village-markets, both because these urban markets were 
geographically close, and because institutional barriers to selling rural products 
on the urban markets were limited.69 These towns provided the markets 
to which much of rural production was geared, not only as centres of 
distribution and consumption, but also increasingly as independent centres of 
production. Leyden, the biggest city in Holland at the start of the sixteenth 
century, had evolved into one of the leading centres of cloth-production. 
Other industries, such as brewing, had started to develop on a large scale 
throughout the province of Holland. Those urban industries became intimately 
connected with rural development, both for the supply of raw materials and 
labour-power.
68. Tielhof 2002, pp. 6–7.
69. Dijkman 2010.
Table 1: Urbanisation in the Low Countries and Britain, 1375–1800
Number of cities with over 10,000 inhabitants





2 (0) 9 (4) 10 (5) 11 (6) 19 (12) 19 (12) 20 (12) 18 (10) 19 (10)
Southern 
Netherlands
11 11 11 12 11 12 12 12 18
Britain 1 1 5 4 6 9 13 23 47
Total population of cities with over 10,000 inhabitants per territory (in thousands)
1375 1475 1500 1550 1600 1650 1700 1750 1800
Northern 
Netherlands
20 98 120 182 365 600 640 570 580
Southern 
Netherlands
210 310 300 360 250 360 380 350 460
Britain 35 70 80 110 250 500 720 1,020 1,870
Source: Israel 1995, p. 115.
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Slowly but surely, the changes in direction of Holland’s agriculture led to the 
spread of credit-relations to the countryside, combined with a diﬀerentiation 
inside the peasantry, in which some peasants managed to become successful 
capitalist-farmers and others were forced to combine their agricultural activities 
with proto-industrial labour. This can be seen as a preceding stage to the 
rise of real capitalist agriculture. However, close connections between rural 
proto-industries and urban production were not necessarily beneﬁcial towards 
further capitalist development.70 Inland Flanders had seen very similar patterns 
of rural production emerging as Holland; labour-intensive commercial 
agriculture on small plots owned by the peasants, combined with extensive 
proto-industrial activities geared towards the large urban centres of (mainly 
textile-) production.71 However, the market-relations between the large 
Flemish cities such as Ghent, Bruges, and Antwerp and their hinterland 
became much more unequal and exploitative than those among their northern 
cousins. The mighty Flemish towns, with ample privileges gained in long and 
bloody struggles against the territorial lords and strong guilds dominating 
urban production and politics, jealously guarded their markets against any 
encroachment by agricultural producers. Peasants could only sell their products 
in the town under tight restrictions, and attempts at independent economic 
development in the countryside, for example by building watermills or 
introducing other more advanced machines, were crushed – sometimes by 
force of arms.72 The proto-industrial activities that developed in the important 
Flemish linen-industry took the form of a ‘Kauf-System’, in which peasants 
individually owned the means of production and produced the linen, but were 
fully dependent on urban merchants for the sale of the end-products. Rather 
than forming a stepping stone for further proletarianisation, these forms of 
rural proto-industrial labour remained static for many centuries.73
In Holland, on the other hand, extra-economic coercion to control the 
countryside by the urban centres remained much more limited. Certainly, 
there were a number of attempts to institute the same barriers to rural 
development as in Flanders.74 But none of the towns of Holland, smaller and 
less powerful than their Flemish counterparts, individually had the strength to 
carry those through. Furthermore, as ’t Hart concludes, ‘the high density of 
towns meant that urban control over the countryside was strongly contested. 
Coercive moves by one town could always be hindered or mitigated by the 
70. Epstein 2001, p. 21.
71. Thoen 2001, pp. 119ﬀ.
72. Dijkman 2010. 
73. Thoen 2001, p. 122.
74. Noordegraaf 2009, p. 133.
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actions of another.’75 Unable to control the countryside politically, burghers 
were much more prone to extend their reach by purely economic means. This 
led to a very diﬀerent type of proto-industrial development, in which urban 
merchant-entrepreneurs invested directly in rural industries. Thus, a layer 
of urban proto-capitalists emerged who not only attained possession of the 
end-products of rural labour, but gained substantial control over every stage of 
the production-process. On the other hand, the loss of control over the means 
of production among peasants set the stage for full proletarianisation once 
these merchant-entrepreneurs started to move large swathes of the production-
process to the cities.76 It is this particular urban-agrarian symbiosis that set the 
stage for the transition to capitalism in Holland.
The ‘discovery’ of rural capitalism in the Northern Netherlands has led to a 
debate on the applicability of the ‘Brenner thesis’.77 Unlike most of his 
followers, Brenner does see important steps in the development of capitalist 
agriculture taking place in the Netherlands. But his theoretical focus sits 
uneasily with the particular trajectory towards agrarian capitalism followed in 
Holland (and, to a lesser extent, Flanders), in which the towns played such a 
crucial rôle.78 As we have seen, the path of specialisation taken by many Dutch 
peasants was only made possible by the presence of strong and independent 
towns, increasingly integrated into a European trading system. Even Brenner 
himself acknowledged this. ‘Here, of course, urban development was more 
intense than in any other region of Europe throughout the long epoch from 
the ninth and tenth centuries into the eighteenth. . . . The outcome was great, 
sustained demand pressure on agriculture over a very extended period, the 
reply to which by Low Countries’ agriculturalists was, moreover, very much 
facilitated by their access to the international grain market.’79 The Dutch case, 
and particularly the path taken by Holland, suggests that to look for the roots 
of capitalism either exclusively in the countryside or in the towns rests on an 
artiﬁcial separation. True, towns were not simply the representatives of 
capitalist trade against a feudal hinterland. But neither were they simply an 
extension of the power of the lords. Town and country were integrated in 
common systems of both trade and production. As Rodney Hilton showed 
convincingly, the towns in Europe arose not in opposition to, but in symbiosis 
with the development of feudalism.80 But this symbiosis itself was not static. 
75. ’t Hart 2001, p. 84. Compare Aten 1995.
76. Van Bavel 2010a, pp. 249–50.
77. Hoppenbrouwers and Van Zanden (eds.) 2001. See also Wood 2002b.
78. A point also made in Mielants 2001, p. 112.
79. Brenner 2001, p. 302. 
80. Hilton 1992.
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Even when the cities of the ﬁfteenth century were part of a wider European 
feudal network of trade, they were not the same as the market-villages that 
feudal lords had once set up to provide for their luxury-demands. A considerable 
number of them had become powerful centres of wealth and production in 
their own right. The urban industries that arose in Holland were intimately 
connected with rural-capitalist development. When the Northern Netherlands 
started to gain a foothold in European trade, this did not simply mean further 
integration into a larger feudal whole. It was coupled to another, opposite 
eﬀect: a slow but fundamental change in the relationship between town and 
country. The connected systems of urban and rural trade and production that 
arose created a society in which the old feudal institutions were steadily being 
pushed to the background. As far as class-struggle accompanied and shaped 
these processes, it was at least three-tiered, involving urban classes as well as 
lords (both manorial and territorial) and peasants.81 
At least in Holland, the late-medieval period saw an almost complete 
erosion of local feudal institutions. The lords who still dominated the province 
politically during most of the sixteenth century had their main landed estates 
elsewhere. The main group of large feudal landowners that remained were the 
religious institutions. However, the power of both traditional groups of 
representatives of feudal society was backed up by the larger feudal states into 
which the Dutch provinces were integrated: ﬁrst the Burgundian state, then 
the Habsburg Empire. The description given by Hobsbawm for the Dutch 
Republic of the seventeenth century might actually be applied with more 
success to the Northern Netherlands of the sixteenth: this was a ‘feudal 
business-economy’. On the ground, both in the countryside and in the towns, 
commerce already ruled supreme. At the top, the independence of the capitalist 
élites was limited by their subordination to feudal-political entities. This 
subordination held important advantages to the urban élites, and most of the 
time they subordinated themselves willingly. But this willingness, or rather the 
ability to settle for a comfortable niche within the larger feudal superstructure 
of Europe, was not without limits. A string of crises during the sixteenth 
century would show the boundaries within which these contradictions could 
be maintained, with truly revolutionary consequences.
From the Dutch Revolt to the Golden Age
The sixteenth century was an age of economic expansion, but also of serious 
disruptions. It is no coincidence that, at the turn of the century, the artistic 
81. Van Bavel 2010c.
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exuberance of the Flemish masters found their counterpoint in the gruesome 
world of Hieronymus Bosch. A number of important industries in this period 
faced stagnation or even decline. Leyden cloth-manufacture did not manage 
to adapt to the rising competition of the ‘new draperies’, as a conservative 
urban élite – including the merchants who controlled the old draperies – 
ﬁnally succeeded in throwing up prohibitions against the establishment of 
new and competing manufactures.82 Trade was aﬀected by the great dynastic 
wars, and the absolutist Habsburg rulers to whom all of the Dutch provinces 
after 1543 belonged tried to gain leverage over merchant-wealth through 
increased taxation and large-scale borrowing on Holland’s capital-market.83 
The merchant-ﬂeet of Holland grew considerably between 1530 and 1567 
due to the expansion of Baltic trade, but also was hindered in the 1560s by the 
closure of the Sound.84 This drove up grain-prices, which caused serious unrest 
among the urban lower classes at a time already characterised by the rise of 
popular religious opposition. With the successful spread of Anabaptism, both 
worldly and spiritual authorities – with the Catholic Church spanning both 
categories – had to contend with a popular Reformation that contained semi-
communist undertones.
These tensions came to a head in the Dutch Revolt that covered the full 
last-third of the sixteenth century. No one will deny that, as well as completely 
changing the political conditions and religious order, the series of events that 
go under this name opened up a new phase in the economic history of the 
Netherlands, even though the exact relationship between the revolution 
against the Habsburg Empire and the ‘Golden Age’ of the seventeenth century 
is hard to trace. Marx and Engels thought of the Revolt as one of the ‘classical’ 
bourgeois revolutions.85 But the bourgeoisie certainly did not make the 
revolution, as I have argued elsewhere.86 Opposition of the leading feudal 
lords to the centralising policies of Philip II ﬁrst destabilised the political-
religious settlement for the Netherlands, and three great waves of urban 
uprisings (1566, 1572 and 1578–9) driven by the artisanal-middle and lower 
classes then shifted the point of gravity of the Revolt away from the nobility. 
Only then could the bourgeoisie in the Northern Netherlands become the 
main benefactor of the Revolt. It is a classic example of Marx’s aphorism that 
82. Brand 1993. 
83. Anderson 1986, pp. 60–1; Tracy 1985, p. 221.
84. Van Zanden 1993c, p. 8. 
85. For example, Marx 1973, p. 192: ‘The model for the revolution of 1789 was (at least in 
Europe) only the [English] revolution of 1648; that for the revolution of 1648 only the revolt of 
the Netherlands against Spain’. 
86. Brandon 2007.
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‘The chevaliers d’industrie . . . only succeeded in supplanting the chevaliers of 
the sword by making use of events of which they themselves were wholly 
innocent.’87
The Revolt had a number of unintended side-eﬀects that greatly stimulated 
the further capitalist development of the Dutch economy. One was the 
conﬁscation of church-lands, which were sold by public auction and thereby 
greatly augmented land-possession as a form of urban investment. Large-scale 
capitalist participation in land-reclamation, combined with the hardships 
suﬀered by peasants from both government and rebel-troops, further altered 
the rural property-structure.88 In Holland, the dominance of small-scale 
peasant-ownership of the land ﬁnally started to give way to commercial 
exploitation on a large scale.89 A second direct result of the Revolt was the loss 
of the political inﬂuence of the nobility and the Catholic clergy, which, at least 
in the province of Holland, left the urban élites in complete control over the 
provincial estates. The same goes, to a somewhat lesser extent, for the other 
provinces. Out of a total of 47 votes in the seven sovereign provincial diets, 
33 were reserved for the towns.90 The purging of former Catholic loyalists 
from the city-magistrates could also have had some eﬀect in opening the 
way for new groups of merchants, who had previously been excluded by 
more conservative merchant-factions. This, for example, seems to have 
been the case in Leyden, where the purging of the magistrate opened up 
city-government to southern refugees involved in new drapery, leading to a 
rapid transformation of Leyden cloth-production.91 
Indirectly, the Revolt had an economic impact through the transformation 
of the state. Overall, the Dutch Revolt left the state ﬁrmly under the control 
of the merchant-industrialists. This became especially clear in matters of war 
and peace, where dynastic ambitions were wholly replaced by commercial 
considerations. Internally, through their control over the provincial States of 
Holland, the merchants exerted enormous political inﬂuence as well. The 
ﬁnancial weight of Holland over the rest of the Republic provided the necessary 
coherence among the diﬀerent provinces, despite internal divisions and 
regional varieties in the pace of the transition. Although the Dutch federal 
state seems like a rather ramshackle construction when looked at in the light 
of later development, the outcome of the manifold political balancing acts 
87. Marx 1965, p. 669.
88. ’t Hart 2011, forthcoming.
89. Van Bavel 2004, p. 139.
90. ’t Hart 2001, p. 82.
91. Lamet 1972, p. 43. 
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between local élites and their particular interests was not unfavourable to the 
further development of capitalism in the seventeenth century. Even when 
the new governors increased taxes to a level the Habsburg rulers could not 
have dreamt of, both the super-rich and substantial parts of the wealthy 
middle-class layers beneath them could feel that their interests were 
well-served. Besides, the state never let the urban élites bear the brunt of 
taxation. Conﬁrming Marx’s observation on the nature of Dutch state-revenues, 
in 1640 over 70 per cent of taxes were levied through excises and semi-direct 
taxes. In 1650, of all taxes farmed out in the Southern part of Holland, 
74.6 per cent consisted of taxes on basic necessities.92 The new state that 
emerged out of the Revolt was extremely eﬀective in letting the poor and 
working classes pay for its commercial-military exploits through a high cost of 
living. The rich, as well as substantial layers of the middle classes, contributed 
through the various forms of state-debt which became an increasingly heavy 
burden on Dutch society as a whole, but remained a secure and proﬁtable 
form of investment for the élites.
The Dutch Revolt liberated one of Europe’s most developed regions from 
the constraints of an empire in which trade and industry were always 
subordinated to royal interests, ultimately guided by the landed interests of 
the Spanish aristocracy and the Catholic Church. The independent republic 
was established in the 1580s – a status that was recognised by the Spanish 
Crown only at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. On the basis of the urban-
agrarian symbiosis created in the late middle ages, the growth in Baltic trade 
of the sixteenth century, the rise of the Amsterdam entrepôt at the expense of 
Antwerp and the unscrupulous use of state-power whenever essential economic 
interests became imperilled, this republic became Europe’s dominant centre of 
capital-accumulation. 
Merchants and manufacturers
Probably the most spectacular eﬀect of the revolt was to launch the newly 
founded republic onto the international scene. Among the ﬁrst deeds of the 
newborn nation was the institution of a naval blockade of the Scheldt estuary, 
a form of economic warfare against the trade of its erstwhile sister provinces 
that it kept in place for over two centuries. From its small territorial base, the 
Dutch started to rival the two Iberian colonial empires, and, soon after the
92. ‘t Hart 1993, pp. 138–9.
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founding of the East India Company (VOC) in 1602, it became the leading 
power in Asia. As in the English Civil War and the French Revolution, 
the revolutionary phase of the Dutch Revolt went seamlessly over into the 
empire-building phase. From the 1590s to the Peace of Utrecht of 1713, the 
Dutch Republic held the position of a European great power. In 1672, 
it survived a combined attack at land and sea by France, England and their 
allies on the eastern border. In 1688, it managed to send an invading force of 
15,000 troops in order to eﬀect ‘régime-change’ within its main commercial 
rival, installing William III of Orange as King of England. During the War 
of the Spanish Succession (1702–13) the Dutch state could pay and supply 
provisions for an army of 120,000 on the strength of a population of barely 
two million. This military power was based on unrivalled commercial 
supremacy. Around 1648, when the war with Spain came to an end, Dutch 
shipping outstripped that of all its European rivals put together. According 
to one estimate, England’s commercial ﬂeet grew from approximately 400 to 
1,400 ships between 1600 and 1700. But, already in 1600, around 1,900 
ships sailed under the Dutch ﬂag. This ﬁgure grew to 2,600 in 1670, to decline 
to the still considerable number of 2,200 in 1700. The total tonnage of 
the English merchant-ﬂeet amounted to approximately 300,000 tons in 1700, 
whereas the Dutch reached double that number in 1670.93 Even in 1800, 
after roughly 150 years of stagnation in overall economic growth, per-capita 
income in the Netherlands was probably higher than in the neighbouring 
countries.94
Popular myth has it that the main source of this wealth was colonial trade. 
Of course, the plundering of the East Indies by the VOC and the active rôle 
in slavery of its less successful brother, the West India Company, contributed 
greatly to the amassing of wealth by many powerful merchant-houses. These 
commercial activities were accompanied by all the great crimes that Marx so 
vividly described in the concluding chapters of the ﬁrst volume of Capital. 
But, in purely numerical terms, the so-called ‘rich trade’ in colonial luxury-
goods was overshadowed by the less adventurous (though certainly not 
peaceful) trade in grain, wood, iron, copper, furs and other bulk goods. As the 
ﬁgures compiled by De Vries and Van der Woude show, European trade, rather 
than colonial trade, formed the backbone of Dutch merchant-capital:
93. Schipper 2001, p. 55.
94. Van Zanden 1993c, p. 6.
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Table 2: Dutch foreign trade in millions of Guilders per year
Ca. 1650 Ca. 1720 Ca. 1770
Export to
Europe, over sea 105 73 72
Southern Netherlands and 
Germany, over land
10 10 20
Outside Europe 5 7 8
Total 120 90 100
Export consisted of
European goods (re-export) 49 26 29
Colonial goods (re-export) 11 22 40
Inland products 60 42 31
Import from
Europe, over sea 120 78 95
Southern Netherlands and 
Germany, over land
5 6 10
Outside Europe 15 24 38
Total 140 108 143
Source: De Vries and Van der Woude 1997, p. 499. 
Colonial goods (including those imported from other European nations) 
formed just over 11 per cent of imports and a mere 9 per cent of exports at the 
height of the ‘Golden Age’. This had grown to 31 and 24 per cent respectively 
around 1720, partly reﬂecting the decline of European overseas import and 
export, partly the growing importance of transatlantic commerce. Only in the 
latter half of the eighteenth century did colonial goods come close to European 
goods as a proportion of foreign trade. True, more of the European imports 
were meant for the Dutch home-market, giving colonial goods greater 
prominence (though still smaller than European goods) in re-export. But the 
export-ﬁgures show something else that challenges the image of a nation 
thriving on long-distance luxury-trade. Dutch products comprised a full 
50 per cent of the total value of exports in 1650, and still 47 per cent in 1720.
An important part of inland-production was directly connected to the 
Dutch function in international trade. This was true for those sectors that 
were at least partially based on the processing of imported materials, the 
so-called traﬁeken [traﬃcs]. Examples are the processing of salt – connected to 
the export of salted herring – and sugar, the sawing of wood, and the distilling 
of alcohol. Rope and sail-making used imported hemp in combination with 
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the Dutch product, and tobacco-industries also depended both on imports 
and on locally produced leaves.95 Shipbuilding was, of course, another sector 
that was tied to trade. De Vries and Van der Woude estimate that, between 
1625 and 1700, an average of 400 to 500 ships a year were produced. They 
calculate that around 10,000 people were employed in this sector – 5 per cent 
of all manufacturing-workers in the province of Holland.96 To escape 
guild-regulation in the towns, much of this production took place in rural 
areas. North of Amsterdam, the area called De Saen [de Zaanstreek] developed 
into a thriving industrial centre. Its development depended on a considerable 
use of technologically advanced machinery such as industrial windmills. 
The total number of industrial mills in De Saen grew from 128 in 1630 to 
584 in 1731, then declined to the still high number of 482 at the end of the 
eighteenth century.97
Technological advance underpinned the competitiveness of Dutch trade. 
Already in the sixteenth century, two new types of ships were developed that 
gave the Dutch a competitive advantage in ﬁshing and carrying trade: the 
herring-buys and the ﬂuyt-ship. The herring-buys allowed a part of the 
processing of the catch to be done on board, enabling the ships to remain at 
sea for longer periods and function as ﬂoating processing factories. The ﬂuyt 
was an easy-to-sail ship, which could carry large tonnages with relatively small 
numbers of men. Since the size of the crew was an important determining 
factor in the total costs of a voyage, the introduction of the ﬂuyt greatly 
enlarged trading proﬁtability. The process of shipbuilding itself was also 
streamlined, introducing assemblage in standardised parts.98 Not only in 
shipbuilding but also in many other forms of manufacturing-production 
during the seventeenth century, the Dutch exported their knowledge, 
technologies and skilled workers to the rest of Europe.99 The textile-industry 
was the largest employer in the Netherlands. It had both a rural and an urban 
component. Even in Amsterdam, which was not a textile-city, 26 per cent of 
all craftsmen and crafts-workers were employed in this trade. Since over half 
the Amsterdam working population was involved in the ‘industrial’ sector, this 
amounts to a total of 14 per cent of all married men.100 In cities such as 
Leyden and Haarlem, in which textile-production was the leading industry, 
the proportion was much higher. Dutch capitalism did not take a lead in 
 95. De Vries and Van der Woude 1997, p. 271.
 96. De Vries and Van der Woude 1997, p. 297.
 97. De Vries and Van der Woude 1997, pp. 346–7.
 98. Unger 1978, p. 86.
 99. Davids 2008, Chapter 5.
100. De Vries and Van der Woude 1997, p. 270.
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textile-production in Europe as it did in shipbuilding, but the use of advanced 
techniques for production allowed it to ﬁnd a substantial niche based on 
high-quality products.
Van Bavel has painted a pessimistic picture of the development of 
manufacture in the Northern Netherlands after 1600. He attaches much 
importance to the introduction of institutions of forced labour, such as 
workhouses, and the apparent strengthening of the guilds from the middle of 
the sixteenth century. The possibility to revert to the use of semi-free labour 
would have formed a barrier to the introduction of manufacture on a large 
scale.101 However, the work of many other authors contradicts this. Noordegraaf 
emphasised the changes occurring in labour-relations due to the growth of 
new types of manufacture. Even when formal guild-structures were maintained – 
and, especially in sectors connected to exports, they often were not – in 
practice those structures did not hinder, and sometimes even stimulated the 
introduction of capitalist relations. ‘Division of labour and hierarchization 
characterized an increasingly large part of industrial activities. Even though 
the traditional craftsman-based businesses continued to represent a numerical 
majority, the economic importance of these businesses declined, in part due 
to the rapid growth of new types of enterprises which were not based on 
the traditional craftsman structure.’102 The seventeenth century saw the 
establishment of some of the largest manufacturing production-lines to be 
found anywhere in the world up until the advent of the Industrial Revolution. 
The shipyards of the East India Company and the ﬁve admiralties employed 
thousands of workers under régimes of intense labour-discipline. Workhouses 
and orphanages were run as commercial undertakings, and rather then being 
a regression to old patterns of semi-forced labour, they might better be seen as 
instruments for the creation of a capitalist work-ethos.
The growth of new manufactures was accompanied by a great intensiﬁcation 
of capitalist investment in agriculture, completing the social and technological 
revolution that had begun in the preceding period. On the basis of this 
transformation, the rural areas in the seventeenth century gained a productivity 
that was high even compared to the most developed European areas of 
the nineteenth century. De Vries argued that its main result was a process 
of diﬀerentiation within rural communities, in which ‘commercial, highly 
capitalized farm enterprises’ gained the upper hand. ‘Surrounding these new 
households, nonagricultural specialists in crafts, transportation, marketing, 
fuel supply, and education arose to provide goods and services that the 
101. Van Bavel 2010a, pp. 260–2.
102. Noordegraaf 1993, p. 137. On the guilds, see Lis and Soly 2006, Epstein and Prak 
2008, and the other contributions in these volumes. 
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unspecialized households of earlier times had endeavored to provide for 
themselves.’103 Countering one of Wood’s main arguments for a non-capitalist 
dynamic in Dutch commercial agriculture, competing for Dutch farmers was 
an imperative rather than an option. Among other things, this can be seen 
from the continued high turnover-rate of land-holding in the most 
commercialised parts of the Netherlands.104
The urban and rural economies were linked up by the growth of a developed 
system of river-transport, carrying both persons and goods.105 Peat was used as 
fuel in smaller industries such as the making of bricks, tiles, glass and pottery, 
as well as in breweries, distilleries, bakeries and textiles. During the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, about 15,000 ships left or returned to Overijssel 
harbours in the rural east to transport peat to the more urbanised parts of the 
country.106 The urban-agrarian symbiosis of the late middle ages had been 
reconstituted at a higher level, reﬂecting a further deepening of the process of 
original accumulation in which labour was ‘freed’ in the double sense used by 
Marx, and capital gained control over large swathes of the home-economy. 
Partly, this was done through an extension of the putting-out system. Leyden 
textile-merchants, for example, managed to gain control over previously 
independent peasant-spinning and weaving activities in Dutch Brabant. 
However, over time, these areas of peasant-production started to evolve as 
industrial centres in their own right. Tilburg forms a striking example of such 
rural-industry led expansion, growing from a small village to a town of 9,000 
inhabitants in a few decades. Individual merchants moved from the Western 
urban centres to these rural regions in order to gain more direct control over 
the production-process.107
Wallerstein, then, was right when he attacked those who wanted to describe 
the Dutch Republic only in terms of its carrying trade: ‘So much ink has been 
spilled to explain why Holland did not industrialize that we tend to overlook 
the fact that it did do so.’108 However, it is probably as important to insist that, 
despite this advance, productive capital never escaped the control of merchant-
capital to become an independent force, as writers from Marx himself to Dobb 
have rightly stressed. The typical capitalist entrepreneur of the early-seventeenth 
century was not the modern industrialist but a merchant-industrialist, who 
brought under his control sections of production as an extension of his 
103. De Vries 1974, p. 120.
104. Van Bavel 2004, p. 139.
105. De Vries 1978.
106. Slicher van Bath 1982, p. 26.
107. ’t Hart 2001, pp. 92–4.
108. Wallerstein 1982, p. 100.
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trading ventures, but whose primary concern always remained with the latter 
rather than the former part of his business.109 Once competitive pressures 
started to rise, their response was not to build up the protective walls of 
mercantilism in order to further the interests of ‘national industries’, since this 
would harm their trading interests. Instead, they slowly retreated from 
productive investment into more secure forms of ﬁnancial dealing. The ties 
between traders and producers gradually weakened, and, even in trade itself, 
these merchants increasingly took a step back. Around the third quarter of 
the seventeenth century, trading on commission overtook trading on the 
merchant’s own account among the major Dutch merchant-houses.110 
Moreover, the relatively advanced nature of manufacturing-production in a 
number of important sectors should not blind us to the conditions prevailing 
in many others. Numerically, if not in terms of its economic weight, small-
scale handicraft-production still dominated in the seventeenth century, as it 
probably did everywhere else at that point in time.111 Though fully directed at 
the market, the focal point of most of the output remained local. The federal 
state, built on a medieval heritage of provincial autonomy that was reinforced 
rather than challenged by the Dutch Revolt, further retarded economic 
integration on a national scale, as Richard Yntema has shown convincingly for 
the beer-industry.112 The weight of local institutions within the federal state 
meant that small urban producers often mounted successful pressure on their 
rulers in order to shield them from the full blows of open competition. Thus, 
while merchant-interests successfully prevented mercantilist measures for 
industrial development on a national scale, protectionism on a local level did 
strengthen with the waning of the ‘Golden Age’. Although economic reforms 
countering these trends were widely discussed during the eighteenth century, 
the state, ﬁrmly held in check ‘from above’ by the competing factions of the 
merchant-oligarchy, and ‘from below’ by the strong position of the urban-
commercial middle classes, did not have the strength to push through a process 
of productive modernisation and started to act as a conservative force instead. 
Dutch capitalist development ﬁnally bit itself on the tail. 
109. Gelder 1982, p. 38. 
110. Jonker and Sluyterman 2000, pp. 83ﬀ.
111. Van Dillen 1970, p. 197.
112. Yntema 2009.
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Decline without ‘refeudalisation’
Does the onset of decline prove that there never had been development towards 
capitalism to begin with? This seems to be the thesis of Ellen Meiksins Wood. 
In her view, already during the ‘Golden Age’, public oﬃce, not production or 
trade, was the predominant source of private wealth for Dutch merchant-
oligarchs.113 This wealth was not ploughed back into the economy through 
productive investment, and so the Dutch economy retained a ‘disproportionate 
dependence on luxury consumption by the wealthy few at home or abroad’. 
This dependence was brought to light by the impact of the seventeenth-
century crisis, which reduced prices of staple exports and demand for luxury-
goods, dragging the other sectors of Dutch production down.114 As a result, 
Dutch élites withdrew into ‘ “extra-economic” strategies and investment in 
politically constituted property’ such as public oﬃce.115
Following Hobsbawm, Wood puts great stress on the impact of the 
‘seventeenth-century crisis’ on the Dutch economy. But the mechanism 
through which this crisis dragged down the Dutch ‘Golden Age’, and the 
timing of this happening remains unclear. This is not only the case in Wood’s 
argument, but actually more generally. Often, the impact of ‘the general crisis’ 
on the Dutch economy is assumed without explaining which sectors were 
aﬀected when, and why. The problem might reside in the rather underspeciﬁed 
nature of the notion of a ‘general crisis’ itself. As for Europe as a whole, this 
links a string of economic depressions which had their epicentre in the decades 
between 1620 and 1660, the political crises in France and England of the 
1640s and 1650s, and a long period of secularly declining prices.116 But, as 
Steensgaard noted long ago, the ‘decades in the middle of the century, when 
the greatest economic diﬃculties were to be found in Spain, Germany, France 
and England, were at the same time the golden age of the Netherlands’.117 This 
is borne out by a closer inspection of growth-trends for the main sectors of the 
Dutch economy.118 Probably, as Marx suggested, growth reached its zenith 
around 1650. But this does not mean that, after this, overall decline set in. The 
second half of the seventeenth century did not see a complete collapse of the 
Dutch economy, but, rather, a long period of stagnation which was felt as a 
decline because others had started to set out on the ﬁrst steps on the road to
113. Wood 2002b, p. 73.
114. Wood 2002b, pp. 78–80.
115. Wood 2002a, p. 92.
116. Trevor-Roper 1967, p. 63; De Vries 1976, pp. 16ﬀ.
117. Steensgaard 1978, p. 36.
118. Van Zanden 1993c, p. 16.
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recovery. Furthermore, the timing of the onset of depression was highly 
diverse for diﬀerent sectors of the Dutch economy. The coincidence of 
stagnation with the increasing competition the Dutch faced from the English 
and the French, both militarily and in trade and manufacture, would suggest 
that it was not the seventeenth-century crisis itself, but, rather, its ending 
that put the Dutch economy in a tight spot. The way in which both England 
and France used the state to draw themselves out of the crisis was itself a 
particular response to Dutch commercial dominance. The Navigation Act and 
Colbert’s tariﬀ-walls launched a new, militarised phase in the transition to 
capitalism. 
There were two areas in which real, absolute decline indeed slowly set in 
during the second half of the seventeenth century. These were the productive 
sector and the traditional carrying trade in grain, herring, salt, textiles and 
wood. The eﬀects were felt sharpest during the eighteenth century, when 
unemployment became endemic in most Dutch cities and many formerly 
successful industries dwindled. However, the order in which economic 
depression hit seems to have been opposite to the one suggested by the 
Hobsbawm-Wood argument. Following the logic of the Dutch Republic as 
a ‘feudal business-economy’ or ‘non-capitalist commercial society’, with 
indigenous commodity-production fully dependent on the strength of 
merchant-capital, it could be expected that a long-term decline in international 
trade would have dragged down the productive sectors of the Dutch economy, 
beginning with those directly connected to the world-market. The opposite 
seems to have been the case. Whereas the production of beer, soap, salt, barrels, 
pottery, tiles, bricks, and the building industry all started their descent during 
the seventeenth century, cloth-production was retained at a stable level until 
ca. 1715, and ship-building, the production of sail-cloth and sawing wood 
until ca. 1725.119 Meanwhile, as the ﬁgures compiled by David Ormrod show, 
the total volume of Dutch trade managed to recover after the initial blow of 
the 1660s, and remained high well into the 1700s. The decline in Baltic trade 
was apparently more than compensated for by the rise of trade with other 
areas. Luxury-trade, far from pulling down the Dutch economy, actually grew 
in absolute size, as can be seen from the ﬁgures for colonial trade.
119. De Vries and Van der Woude 1997, p. 336.
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1622 2,619 2,320 4,939
1624–5 12,163 557
1640s 17,110 1,106
1660s 4,395 900 3,239 8,534 12,200 1,626
1690s 17,529 2,224
1699–1701 5,849 1,986 4,433 12,268
1716–20 6,054 2,291 4,739 13,084
1733–5 7,757 3,104 5,717 16,578
1749–55 8,144 3,438 8,645 20,227
1753 8,625 3,511 8,732 20,868 16,392 4,067
1764–76
1772–4 12,735 5,818 9,853 28,406
1779 10,660 5,580 7,013 23,253 15,784 3,308
1784–8 15,303 4,286 11,050 30,639
1790 17,443 4,828 14,057 36,328 14,350 2,759
Source: Ormrod 2003, pp. 56–7.
Neither is it true that the initial reaction to increased competitive pressures 
was decidedly non-capitalist. According to De Vries and Van der Woude, the 
response of manufacturers was threefold: ‘changes in product mix, introduction 
of labor-saving technology, and locational shifts toward lower-wage regions’.120 
Ultimately, many of these strategies remained unsuccessful, but this only 
became clear in the course of the eighteenth century.
The other central argument for the non-capitalist nature of Dutch society is 
the supposed withdrawal of the Dutch merchant-élite into non-economic 
forms of surplus-extraction. This ties in with a long-lasting debate within 
Dutch historiography on seventeenth- and eighteenth-century processes of 
‘aristocratisation’. After they had established their power during the Dutch 
Revolt, the ruling merchants soon started to develop into a closed oligarchy 
with a strong hold on urban and provincial governments. With economic 
decline, these ruling merchants tended to withdraw from active trading, 
instead investing in landed property and government-bonds, and acquiring a 
more ‘aristocratic’ lifestyle.121 This argument certainly contains much that is 
120. De Vries and van der Woude 1997, p. 676.
121. For example, Roorda 1964.
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valid. Members of the Dutch ruling class became increasingly involved in the 
accumulation of political functions. Already in the seventeenth century, many 
had combined business-careers with public oﬃce, often shared within their 
family or close circle.122 However, only for a minority of those involved in 
running the state did oﬃce-holding become the most important source of 
income.123 Most positions within the state did not earn an income of more 
than f 2000 a year. Only a minority of all regents became rich or richer just by 
taking part in politics.124 
The most successful members of the Dutch governing élite of the seven-
teenth century managed to combine oﬃce-holding with their economic 
functions as merchant-entrepreneurs or long-distance traders. Not everyone 
did so in such a caricatured fashion as Willem Hoppevelt and Abraham 
Keyser, who substituted their income from minor functions as scribes for the 
province of Holland with a highly proﬁtable international business in secret 
state-papers.125 Much more common were the cases of Reynier Cant, Louis 
Trip and Gillis Sautijn, who combined ruling functions in the Amsterdam 
city-government with trade in cannons and ammunition.126 Whereas, in many 
other countries, such interpenetration of oﬃce and trade led to the complete 
overpowering of the market by monopolistic practices and personal trading 
privileges, this seems to have been far less the case in the Dutch Republic. 
The direct participation of a very substantial part of the economic ruling 
class in oﬃce created strong checks against individual merchants using state-
power for their own exclusive beneﬁt. Despite a number of spectacular cases 
of corruption, public auctioning and ‘open’ competition in government-
contracting were probably more dominant even than in England.127 In 
absolutist France or Spain, the close ties between small groups of merchants or 
ﬁnanciers and the state led to a colonisation of the growing market-relations 
by royal interests. In the Netherlands, similar integration resulted in a form of 
collective ‘bourgeois self-rule’. 
Large-scale investment in state-obligations became a favourite form of 
securitisation of existing wealth for those merchants-cum-politicians. But 
laying a hand on state-revenues was not a hidden form of refeudalisation or a 
transition to tributary relations, as it might have been in countries such as 
122. Adams 2005.
123. Zandvliet 2006, p. xv.
124. De Jong 1987, p. 82.
125. Knevel 2001, pp. 97–9.
126. Burke 1974, pp. 59–60.
127. This conclusion is aﬃrmed by my own research on military contracting in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, which I hope to publish soon.
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Spain or France where state-income still ultimately rested on surpluses amassed 
by extra-economic extraction. Dutch tax-income in the eighteenth century as 
much as in the seventeenth rested on the highly commercialised nature of the 
Dutch economy. It was a form of redistribution and concentration of wealth, 
but one that was ﬁrmly rooted in the developed commercial base of the 
economy. Once decline in the industrial sector set in, a substantial part of the 
ruling capitalists transformed themselves from active merchant-industrialists 
into ﬁnancial capitalists. In this way, aristocratisation did take place, although 
it should be sharply delineated from the ‘refeudalisation’ that occurred when 
the ruling merchants of the Italian city-states reverted to non-commercial 
landholding. In his study of the Leyden élite of the eighteenth century, 
Maarten Prak showed that an average member of the city-magistrate held a 
staggering 60 per cent of their assets in state-obligations, for which they 
received a rent. Another 11.7 per cent – or 15 per cent for the family-members 
of regents – was invested in foreign, mainly British, loans and stocks. Houses, 
land and titles made up 13.9 per cent of the regents’ wealth, but much of this 
consisted of productive investments in capitalist agriculture.128 The situation 
in Leyden was more-or-less representative for most of the Republic, except 
that ‘industrial’ decline was probably sharper than elsewhere. 
The large amount of revenues that could be redistributed among the Dutch 
ruling class through state-bonds is a reminder that eighteenth-century decline 
should not be seen in overly absolute terms. Even in the sphere of production, 
the Dutch Republic probably remained one of the most advanced societies in 
Europe. But the inability to break through the trends toward ﬁnancialisation, 
the persistent economic localism and political fragmentation did mean that 
Dutch early-modern capitalism could not become the launching-pad for an 
industrial revolution. The ruling class of the Dutch Republic by-and-large 
did not favour the attempts at reform for industrial revival that were proposed 
by more farsighted statesmen in the course of the eighteenth century. Instead, 
the Amsterdam capital-market became a major source of money-capital 
underpinning the British state-debt and private investment.129 Whereas, from 
a national perspective, the transition to capitalism was stalled, from a global 
perspective it was partially displaced, feeding into the British industrial 
revolution while continuing to ﬁll the pockets of the Dutch ruling class. When 
in the 1780s, and again in 1795, revolutionary movements rose against this 
regent-class, the ‘ﬁght against aristocracy’ became a popular battle-cry. But 
those movements never had to dispose of a real aristocracy of the land. This 
128. Prak 1985, p. 117.
129. Riley 1980, pp. 119ﬀ. 
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had been broken economically in the late-medieval period, and politically in 
the course of the Dutch Revolt. What remained of it was largely a symbolic 
force. The second round of the bourgeois revolution was directed against the 
monied aristocracy of the Amsterdam stock-exchange, which had managed to 
integrate itself into international capital while forming a barrier to industrial 
development in the Netherlands itself.
Conclusions
In the debate on the transition from feudalism to capitalism, the Dutch 
Republic has ﬁgured as a fully crystallised form of merchant-capitalism. But 
the arguments on both sides of the debate have been based on an image of 
pre-industrial Dutch society that is often sketchy, stereotypical and outdated. 
This article has sought to provide a more rounded view, corresponding to the 
current state of historical research. Central to the alternative interpretation of 
Dutch early-modern capitalism presented here has been to show how strongly 
Dutch commercial primacy was actually rooted in a transformation at the point 
of production, rather than being artiﬁcially crafted on a non-capitalist base.
This reinterpretation raises serious diﬃculties for both major strands in 
the debate. On the one hand, if even the most mercantile of all merchant-
Republics could only ﬂourish on the basis of a prior social transformation at 
the point of production, this adds to the criticisms that were made of the 
Sweezy-Wallerstein school of commercialisation as the driving force towards 
capitalism. On the other hand, taking seriously the interplay between rural- 
and urban-economic development that was so central to the Dutch case poses 
real problems for the Brenner school, with its almost exclusive focus on 
agricultural class-relations and its elevation of one privileged English path of 
agrarian transformation as the ultimate measure of success. First, even within 
the small area of the Northern Low Countries, not one, but at least three 
distinct trajectories led to the spread of capitalist relations in agriculture. 
Second, their form and content did not only rely on class-relations in the 
countryside, but, crucially, on the interaction between development in the 
countryside and in the towns, leading to an urban-agrarian symbiosis involving 
trade and production. Third, the success of this symbiosis depended on the 
growing division of labour between various regions of Europe expressed in 
the expansion of international trade, even when the way in which the Dutch 
provinces managed to integrate themselves into this expanding trade-network 
diﬀered from that of the Hanse cities or the Italian city-states because of 
the extent to which capitalist relations had already taken root in ﬁshing, 
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manufacture and agriculture. Fourth, the importance of the Dutch Revolt in 
freeing the economy of the Low Countries from the political constraints that 
followed from their integration into the Habsburg Empire suggests that a 
revolutionary transformation of the state-structure was indispensible in 
furthering capitalist development, even though this revolution was not 
initiated by the bourgeoisie itself, and was neither the starting-point nor the 
ﬁnal act in the transition.
The seventeenth-century expansion of Dutch capitalism left a huge imprint 
on the spread of the system worldwide. While important, this impact was 
certainly not conﬁned to that of the Dutch East India Company and the 
Dutch rôle in the transatlantic slave-trade. Contrary to long-established views, 
homeland-production far outstripped colonial goods and luxuries even in 
foreign trade. The seventeenth-century ‘Golden Age’ saw the deepening of the 
medieval urban-agrarian symbiosis, extension of wage-labour, substantial 
development of manufacture and the growing economic integration of the 
diﬀerent regions within the Dutch Republic. However, the Dutch trajectory 
of capitalist development also carried strong marks of its early birth. Although 
the strength of merchant-capital went hand-in-hand with substantial changes 
in production, the core of the capitalist class always remained focused primarily 
on trade. This started to become a serious hindrance to further capitalist 
development once the Dutch were outcompeted or forced out of international 
markets by political means from the 1650s onwards. Financialisation, based 
on the strong integration in international capital-ﬂows, proved the easier 
option for the Dutch ruling class over a restructuring of production, leading 
to the long eighteenth-century depression. Meanwhile, the consistent localism 
and small scale of production meant that drawing-up the walls of urban 
protectionism remained the preferred answer to increased competition for 
much of the urban middle classes. The federal state-apparatus, probably more 
directly populated and controlled by the leading capitalist families than any 
state before or afterwards, could never act as a counterweight to these trends. 
Instead, it helped to enforce economic policies that were characterised by the 
absence of protectionism on a national scale and strong protectionism on a 
local scale. These strongly favoured merchant and ﬁnancial capital over 
productive capital, creating social tensions that contributed to the revolutionary 
waves of the 1780s and 1790s.
The advanced economic structure of the seventeenth-century Dutch 
Republic did not become the launching-pad for an early industrial revolution. 
But, reading the history of the transition backwards from its late-eighteenth 
century result has marred our understanding of the many changes in the shape 
of capitalism before its ﬁnal breakthrough. Too much of the transition-debate 
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has been recast as a debate on ‘why Britain succeeded and the rest failed’. 
What is lost in this way is Marx’s fundamental insight into the international 
character of the transition, in which the ‘diﬀerent momenta of primitive 
accumulation distribute themselves . . ., more or less in chronological order, 
particularly over Spain, Portugal, Holland, France, and England’.130 The story 
of this distribution of moments is not simply one of linear national trajectories, 
consisting of many failures and one privileged path to success. Rather, it 
consists of a real dialectical unity, in which the stalled fragments of capitalist 
development in one country formed the elements of its further development 
in the next.
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